Age of avatar modulates the altercentric bias in a visual perspective-taking task:ERP and behavioral evidence by Ferguson, Heather J. et al.
                                                                    
University of Dundee
Age of avatar modulates the altercentric bias in a visual perspective-taking task
Ferguson, Heather J.; Brunsdon, Victoria E.A.; Bradford, Lizzie
Published in:
Cognitive, Affective and Behavioral Neuroscience
DOI:
10.3758/s13415-018-0641-1
Publication date:
2018
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in Discovery Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Ferguson, H. J., Brunsdon, V. E. A., & Bradford, L. (2018). Age of avatar modulates the altercentric bias in a
visual perspective-taking task: ERP and behavioral evidence. Cognitive, Affective and Behavioral Neuroscience,
18, 1298-1319. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13415-018-0641-1
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in Discovery Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with
these rights.
 • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from Discovery Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
 • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain.
 • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 22. Sep. 2020
Age of avatar modulates the altercentric bias in a visual
perspective-taking task: ERP and behavioral evidence
Heather J. Ferguson1 & Victoria E. A. Brunsdon1 & Elisabeth E. F. Bradford1
Published online: 21 September 2018
# The Author(s) 2018
Abstract
Despite being able to rapidly and accurately infer their own and other peoples’ visual perspectives, healthy adults experience
difficulty ignoring the irrelevant perspective when the two perspectives are in conflict; they experience egocentric and altercentric
interference. We examine for the first time how the age of an observed person (adult vs. child avatar) influences adults’ visual
perspective-taking, particularly the degree to which they experience interference from their own or the other person’s perspective.
Participants completed the avatar visual perspective-taking task, in which they verified the number of discs in a visual scene
according to either their own or an on-screen avatar’s perspective (Experiments 1 and 2) or only from their own perspective
(Experiment 3), where the two perspectives could be consistent or in conflict. Age of avatar was manipulated between
(Experiment 1) or within (Experiments 2 and 3) participants, and interference was assessed using behavioral (Experiments 1–
3) and ERP (Experiment 1) measures. Results revealed that altercentric interference is reduced or eliminated when a child avatar
was present, suggesting that adults do not automatically compute a child avatar’s perspective. We attribute this pattern to either
enhanced visual processing for own-age others or an inference on reduced mental awareness in younger children. The findings
argue against a purely attentional basis for the altercentric effect, and instead support an account where both mentalising and
directional processes modulate automatic visual perspective-taking, and perspective-taking effects are strongly influenced by
experimental context.
Keywords Theory ofMind . Visual perspective-taking . Altercentric interference . Self/other . ERPs
Visual perspective-taking involves an assessment of what or
how another person sees a visual stimulus, independent of
what or how we see that same stimulus ourselves. These pro-
cesses are therefore central to Theory of Mind (ToM), and the
ability to ascribe mental states (e.g., knowledge, beliefs, inten-
tions, etc.) to the self and others. In recent years, researchers
have become increasingly interested in the individual differ-
ences that predict an observer’s ability to take another person’s
perspective. This busy field of research has identified numer-
ous characteristics that modulate success on a variety of ToM
tasks, including the observer’s age (e.g., Phillips et al., 2011),
working memory, and inhibitory control skills (e.g., Bradford,
Jentzsch, & Gomez, 2015; Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Cane,
Ferguson, & Apperly, 2017; German & Hehman, 2006; Lin
et al., 2010), attentional processes (Rubio-Fernández &
Geurts, 2016), social skills (Brunyé et al., 2012; Ferguson
et al., 2015; Kessler & Wang, 2012; Nielsen et al., 2015),
mood (Converse et al., 2008), and cultural background (Wu
& Keysar, 2007). In contrast, very little research has consid-
ered how characteristics of the observed person might influ-
ence perspective-taking success. The current study addresses
this issue by examining how the age of an observed person
(adult vs. child avatar) influences adults’ visual perspective-
taking, particularly the degree to which they experience inter-
ference from their own (i.e., egocentric) or the other person’s
(i.e., altercentric) perspective when responding from the
Bother^ or Bself^ perspective, respectively.
A popular paradigm that has been used to examine visual
perspective-taking is the Bavatar^ task, in which participants
have to verify the number of discs in a visual scene according
to either their own or a central on-screen avatar’s perspective.
Crucially, in some trials the two perspectives are inconsistent
(i.e., each sees a different number of discs), while in others
they are consistent. Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews,
and Bodley Scott (2010) found that healthy adults can rapidly
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and accurately compute other people’s visual perspectives, or
respond according to their own broader viewpoint (whichmay
include objects that are hidden from the avatar’s view).
Nevertheless, participants’ responses were slower and less
accurate for trials in which judging what the avatar could see
required them to inhibit their own visual perspective, and
when judging what they could see required them to inhibit
the avatar’s visual perspective. Thus, participants experienced
difficulty ignoring the irrelevant perspective (i.e., either what
they saw or what the avatar saw) when the two perspectives
differed; performance on the task was influenced by both ego-
centric and altercentric tendencies.
While this pattern has been replicated numerous times (e.g.,
Catmur et al., 2016; Conway et al., 2017; Ferguson, Apperly, &
Cane, 2017; Nielsen et al., 2015; Qureshi, Apperly, & Samson,
2010; Santiesteban et al., 2014), there has been much debate in
the literature regarding whether the altercentric effect genuinely
reflects interference from the avatar’s perspective (i.e., automat-
ic mentalising), or whether it is driven by domain-general at-
tentional cues based on directional features of the avatar (i.e.,
sub-mentalising; Heyes, 2014; Santiesteban et al., 2014). To
test these alternatives, researchers have compared effects when
the central avatar is replaced by a non-social (directional) cue
(e.g., an arrow, lamp, or wall; Samson et al., 2010, Experiment
3; Nielsen et al., 2015; Santiesteban et al., 2014; Schurz et al.,
2015) or when the avatar’s view of the stimulus is restricted
(e.g., by opaque goggles/barrier, or an Binvisibility^ telescope;
Furlanetto et al., 2016; Cole et al., 2016; Conway et al., 2017).
Results are inconsistent across these studies, with some show-
ing that altercentric interference is attenuated when a non-social
(i.e., inanimate) agent is present or when they have a restricted
view of the stimulus, therefore supporting a mentalizing ac-
count, but others revealing comparable inconsistency effects
for inanimate and restricted view designs, thus supporting the
dominant role of attentional processes.
The current study uses the avatar visual perspective-taking
task to test whether the age of the observed person (adult vs.
child avatar) influences adults’ visual perspective-taking per-
formance. Therefore, while we do not directly aim to test
mentalizing versus directional accounts of automatic perspec-
tive-taking, the results clearly have a bearing on this debate.
Specifically, a purely attentional account would predict no dif-
ference between child and adult avatars since directional fea-
tures (i.e., forehead, eyes, nose, etc.) are equated between av-
atars. In contrast, if we find that avatar age modulates
altercentric interference this would suggest that participants
have inferred different mental states for child and adult avatars,
and therefore would support the role ofmentalizing in this task.
Our age manipulation links to neuroimaging research that has
revealed overlapping neural activation between self and other
mentalizing when the person is considered to be similar to the
self, but not when the person is different from the self (Davis
et al., 1996; Mahajan & Wynn, 2012; Mitchell et al., 2006;
Pfeifer et al., 2009). This pattern suggests that participants refer
to their own perspective to understand how a similar person
might be seeing, feeling, or thinking, and fits with a spontaneous
perspective-taking mechanism that is especially pronounced
when one feels socially connected to the other person (Smith &
Mackie, 2016). In line with this, studies that have examined how
similarity between the self and other influences mental state in-
ferences report greater egocentric interference when people are
taking the perspective of an ingroup member compared to an
outgroup member (e.g., Simpson & Todd, 2017; Savitsky
et al., 2011; Todd et al., 2011). In particular, Simpson and Todd
(2017) adapted the avatar task described above by manipulating
the group membership of the avatar, such that university affilia-
tions and personality traits distinguished in-group fromout-group
members. Results revealed increased egocentric interferencewith
in-group than out-group avatars, but no influence of avatar group
membership on altercentric interference (though shared group
membership did facilitate Bother^ perspective-taking on consis-
tent trials). In the current study our choice to examine effects of
the avatar’s age was based on research that has demonstrated an
own-age bias, reflecting enhanced performance in a range of
social perception tasks when the other person is in the same
age category as the perceiver (e.g., Bailey et al., 2014;
Melinder et al., 2010; Rhodes & Anastasi, 2012; Slessor et al.,
2010; Slessor et al., 2014).
We complement the standard behavioral data collected in
this paradigm by recording event-related brain potentials
(ERPs) to examine the effects of perspective-taking and age
of avatar in real-time. To date only one study has applied this
technique to the avatar visual perspective-taking paradigm
(McCleery et al., 2011); however, a growing number of stud-
ies have used ERPs to examine other aspects of ToM.Many of
these studies have examined the brain’s response as partici-
pants answer explicit belief questions (e.g., Bwhere does X
think the Y is?^, e.g., Liu et al., 2004, 2009; Sabbagh &
Taylor, 2000; Wang et al., 2008; Zhang et al., 2009), or pas-
sively observe pictorial sequences of events depicting beliefs
and desires (e.g., Geangu et al., 2013; Kühn-Popp et al., 2013;
Meinhardt et al., 2012), and have consistently demonstrated a
positive-going late frontal slow wave (LFSW, ~300 ms on-
wards) when people are required to reason about others’
(false) beliefs versus reality. Though there is general agree-
ment that differences on the LFSW reflect the key processes
that distinguish mental states from reality (Liu et al., 2004;
Sabbagh & Taylor, 2000), the exact mechanisms that underlie
this component remain controversial due to the variety of par-
adigms and component definitions (i.e., time course or topog-
raphy) that have been used in existing studies. Thus, deflec-
tions of the LFSW have been attributed to the experience of
conflicting self/other perspectives (Jiang et al., 2016), the need
to inhibit the self-perspective when inferring others’ beliefs
(Zhang et al., 2009), and shifting between external stimuli
and internal mental representations (Meinhardt et al., 2011).
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More recently, researchers have reported effects of self-other
processing on another ERP component, the P300, in a variety
of social cognitive paradigms (see Knyazev, 2013 for a review).
These studies typically manipulate the consistency of self-
reference with auditory, visual, or sensory experiences (e.g.,
own name/face pairings, Cygan, Tacikowski, Ostaszewski,
Chojnicka, & Nowicka, 2014; observed/intended actions,
Deschrijver, Wiersema, & Brass, 2017; self/other touch,
Deschrijver, Wieserma, & Brass, 2016). This work has consis-
tently shown modulation of the P300 when processing self-
relevant information, suggesting that this component indexes
the distinction between self and other perspectives. However, in
contrast to non-social oddball-type effects (e.g., Picton, 1992;
Polich, 2007), these self-referenced effects reveal larger P300
amplitudes for self-compatible conditions compared to self-
incompatible conditions. It has been suggested that this pattern
reflects the increased need to resist interference when self and
other perspectives are inconsistent, meaning that less resources
are available to generate the P300 (Deschrijver et al., 2017).
Thus, similar to the LFSW, self-referenced modulations of the
P300 are likely to reflect both the social process of
distinguishing self and other perspectives, and the recruitment
of higher-order cognitive processes to evaluate self-related
stimuli, and support increased allocation of attention and con-
flict resolution (Conde et al., 2015; Tacikowski & Nowicka,
2010). We note that the existing literature does not provide a
clear distinction between the social and cognitive contributions
to LFSW and P300 components, and indeed some researchers
have reflected on whether the two components might reflect
common processes given the overlapping time windows and
scalp distributions (Jiang, Li, Li, Wang, Cao, & Li, 2016).
One study has directly explored the neural basis of visual
perspective-taking by recording ERPs and estimating the neural
sources while participants completed an auditory-visual version
of the avatar visual perspective-taking task (McCleery et al.,
2011; e.g., Bshe sees N^ - [image]). Results revealed that per-
spective and consistency modulated numerous ERP compo-
nents, including the amplitude of the P200 (larger amplitude
over occipital midline electrodes for self-inconsistent trials than
any other trial types), and the latency and amplitude of a middle
latency component (referred to as TP450; longer peak latencies
for other- than self-perspective trials, particularly other-incon-
sistent, and larger peak amplitudes for consistent compared to
inconsistent trials). Consistency also modulated the LFSW be-
tween 600–800 ms (consistent > inconsistent). The authors
suggest that modulations of the P200 component reflect strate-
gic allocation of visual attention, since the self-inconsistent
condition is the only trial type that requires attention to be
divided between both walls (i.e., in front and behind the avatar).
Crucially, the latency of deflections of the TP450 were attrib-
uted to the processing costs of calculating the avatar’s perspec-
tive (which are highest in the other-inconsistent condition), with
source analyses linking TP450 effects to the temporal parietal
cortex (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). These TP450 effects, show-
ing influences of perspective and consistency, are therefore
compatible with the interference effects seen on the P300 in
the self-other tasks described above. Finally, the consistency
effect on the LFSW amplitude is interpreted as reflecting the
recruitment of executive functions to manage conflicting per-
spectives (localized to the right frontal cortex), and is therefore
consistent with the ERP studies of belief processing, described
above (e.g., Jiang et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2009).
In this paper, we present three experiments that systemati-
cally examine whether and how age of avatar influences
adults’ visual perspective-taking. In our first experiment, we
recorded ERPs and behavioral responses while participants
completed a version of the avatar visual perspective-taking
task, with age of avatar manipulated between two groups
(adult vs. child). In line with previous studies we predicted
that this task would elicit both egocentric and altercentric in-
terference effects, reflected in reduced accuracy and increased
reaction times when the two perspectives were in conflict (i.e.,
a main effect of consistency). Replicating previous work, we
also expected this consistency effect on reaction times to be
larger when cued to take the avatar’s perspective than when
cued to take the self perspective (i.e., a perspective × consis-
tency interaction), reflecting the heightened need to inhibit
irrelevant perspectives, with greater interference from the ego-
centric perspective than the altercentric perspective. Given the
converging effects seen across previous ERP investigations of
ToM processing, our ERP analyses focused on three key com-
ponents: P200 (associated with perceptual processing), P300,
and LFSW (reflecting self-other distinctions and the manage-
ment of self-other conflicts). Thus, if deflections of the P200
reflect relatively low-level strategic allocation of visual atten-
tion, we expected to replicate McCleery et al.’s pattern of
maximal amplitude for self-inconsistent trials (due to divided
attention on these trials). More importantly, we expected the
higher-level processes of distinguishing self/other perspec-
tives and inhibiting the alternative perspective to be reflected
in reduced P300 and LFSWamplitudes for inconsistent trials,
with a larger consistency effect on these components for other-
than self-perspective trials since the self (egocentric) perspec-
tive causes greater interference (and thus less available cogni-
tive resources) than altercentric intrusions (as in Deschrijver
et al., 2017). McCleery et al. used source localization to make
a clear distinction between the mechanisms underlying their
mid-latency TP450 component (representing social self-other
conflict processes) and the LFSW waveform (executive pro-
cesses to manage conflict). However, due to paradigm and
component differences in the current studies, and based on
the existing literature that implicates both ToM and executive
processes, we do not tie our predictions on the P300 and
LFSW components to distinct social/cognitive mechanisms.
Crucially, if the age of avatar manipulation activates dis-
tinct mental state processing mechanisms for similar and
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dissimilar others then we would expect to see modulations of
these perspective-taking effects according to the age of avatar,
via an own-age bias (i.e., an avatar × consistency interaction,
or an avatar ×perspective × consistency interaction). Such
modulations should be limited to response times, P300 ampli-
tude, and LFSW amplitude since these measures have been
shown to directly reflect high-level self-other processing and
conflict (note that we do not expect age of avatar to influence
low-level attention allocation, as measured by P200 ampli-
tude). We expected this effect to reflect reduced processing
of the other perspective when a child (i.e., dissimilar) versus
adult (i.e., similar) avatar was present, and for it to be manifest
in a reduced or absent altercentric interference effect (similar
to previous studies that have manipulated avatar animacy/
view, e.g., Furlanetto et al., 2016; Schurz et al., 2015), and/
or a larger egocentric interference effect (similar to the ingroup
effect seen in Simpson & Todd, 2017). In contrast, a purely
directional account that does not activate spontaneous
mentalizing would not predict any differences in processing
between adult and child avatars, since directional features are
matched between avatars.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants
A total of 38 English-speaking Caucasian students from the
University of Kent took part in the study. Four of these par-
ticipants were excluded due to poor accuracy on the task
(<50%) or poor quality of EEG data (resulting in a trial loss
of > 40%). Thus, the final sample included 34 participants (24
female; 29 right-handed; Mage = 20.5 years), split equally
between the adult and child avatar groups, and matched be-
tween groups on gender and age. This sample size was deter-
mined a priori to match the sample size used in McCleery
et al.’s (2011) ERP avatar visual perspective-taking task (N
= 17) in each of our avatar age groups.
All participants completed the Empathy Quotient (Baron-
Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004), a 40-item self-report question-
naire that assesses empathy and social aptitude. In addition, all
participants completed the Simon task (Simon & Wolf, 1963),
consisting of 80 trials (40 consistent/40 inconsistent), and an
inhibitory control score was calculated by subtracting reaction
times for correct responses on consistent trials from inconsistent
trials. Age of avatar groups was therefore statistically matched on
participants’ gender (12 females and five males in each group),
age (adultM = 21.5; childM = 19.5; t = 1.57), empathy quotient
score (adult M = 40.8; child M = 37.9; t = .88), and inhibitory
control score (adultM = 21.4; childM = 19.0; t = .88).
Materials
Participants took part in a visual perspective-taking task
(adapted from Samson et al., 2010) while EEG activity was
continuously recorded. The visual stimuli included a 3D lateral
view of a room, where the ceiling, floor, left, right and back
walls were visible. Red discs were displayed on one or two of
the left/right walls. The number and position of discs changed
on each trial. In addition, a realistic human avatar was standing
in the center of the room, facing either the left or right wall. The
avatar’s gender always matched the participant’s gender, but
half the participants saw an adult-like avatar, and the other half
saw a child-like avatar.1 On half the trials, the avatar’s orienta-
tion meant that s/he saw the same number of discs as the
participant (consistent condition), and on the other half, the
avatar’s orientation meant that s/he could not see some of the
discs that were visible to the participant (since theywere placed
on the wall behind the avatar; inconsistent condition). See Fig.
1 for examples of these visual stimuli, and the Open Science
Framework for the full set of materials (https://osf.io/bqw4h).
To ensure that the directional features were matched between
child and adult avatars, the stimuli were pre-tested using a Posner
paradigm (Posner, 1980). Sixteen participants (Mage = 24.8
years) completed a total of 96 trials in a within-subjects design
that crossed avatar (child vs. adult) and gaze-cue validity (valid
vs. invalid), thus 24 trials in each condition. Trials began with a
central fixation cross in the empty 3D room (700 ms), followed
by the central avatar facing left or right (i.e., the gaze cue; 300
ms), and finally a single red disc appeared on the left or right wall
(replicating the position of discs used in the main task) until a
response was made. Correct response times were analyzed using
a within-subjects 2 × 2 ANOVA, crossing avatar (adult vs. child)
and gaze-cue validity (valid vs. invalid). Results revealed a sig-
nificant main effect of gaze-cue validity (valid = 311 ms vs.
invalid = 336 ms, F(1, 15) = 141.3, p < .001, pη
2 = .9), but no
main effect of avatar (F = .01, p = .91), or an interaction between
the two variables (F = .51, p = .49).
Procedure
Participants were informed about the EEG procedure and ex-
perimental task. Their task was to verify the number of discs
that were visible either according to their own perspective
(self-perspective condition), or according to the avatar’s per-
spective (other-perspective condition). Trials were either
matching or mismatching. On matching trials, the cue digit
corresponded to the number of discs that could be seen from
the cue perspective for the target image. On mismatching
1 These age classifications were confirmed by participants at the end of the
task. Adult-like avatars were judged to have a median age of 25 years old
(Female = 25.3 years old; Male = 24.6 years old), and child-like avatars a
median age of 6 years old (Girl = 6.1 years old; Boy = 6.6 years old).
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trials, the cue digit did not correctly correspond to the number
of discs that could be seen from the cue perspective. After
electrode application they were seated in a booth where they
read the materials from a computer screen. The experiment
was controlled using E-Prime software.
Each trial began with a fixation cross in the center of the
screen for 750 ms. Following a blank screen inter-stimulus inter-
val (ISI) of 150 ms, 250 ms, or 350 ms,2 the word BYOU^ or
BSHE/ HE^ was presented for 750 ms. This informed partici-
pants whether to respond to the current trial according to their
own or the avatar’s perspective. Following a second blank screen
ISI, a digit between 0 and 3was shown in the center of the screen
for 750 ms. This indicated the number of discs the participant
needed to verify, according to the given perspective. Finally, the
target image of the room, avatar, and discs (650 × 480 pixels)
appeared centrally on-screen. Participants were instructed to
judge whether the number of discs in the target image matched
the preceding digit according to the cued perspective or not,
using keys Bz^ and Bm^ (key associations were counterbalanced
across participants). Participants were asked to respond as quick-
ly and accurately as possible. The screen advanced to the next
trial once a keyboard response had been detected or for a max-
imum of 2000 ms (see Fig. 2).
Participants completed a practice block of 26 trials, follow-
ed by the main task, which consisted of 12 blocks, each with
52 trials. In total there were 288 matching trials, 288
mismatching trials, and 48 Bfiller^ trials (where no discs were
displayed on either wall so that the disc number 0 was some-
times correct for self-perspective trials). Participants were
asked to respond according to their own perspective on half
the trials, and to respond according to the avatar’s perspective
on the other half. Of these, half were consistent trials, where
the avatar and participant saw the same amount of discs on the
wall, and half were inconsistent trials, where the avatar and
participants’ views were different. Trials were presented in a
pseudorandom order mixing self and other perspectives, such
that no more than four consecutive trials that tapped the same
perspective, and no more than three consecutive trials tapped
the same perspective-consistency condition. No complete
stimulus repetitions (i.e., same perspective cue and image)
were included. The full experiment lasted for about 80 min.
In sum, three independent variables were manipulated in a
2 (Consistency: consistent vs. inconsistent) × 2 (Perspective:
self vs. other) × 2 (Avatar: adult vs. child) mixed design, with
Consistency and Perspective being within-subjects and Avatar
being between-subjects. Effects were analyzed at the target
image, on accuracy of responses, response time, and the
ERP components as detailed below.
Electrophysiological measures
EEG activity was recorded continuously using a Brain Vision
Quickamp amplifier system with a 62-channel ActiCap, over
midline electrodes Fz, Cz, CPz, Pz, POz, and Oz, over the left
2 Note that these variable ISIs were used to match those used in McCleery
et al. (2011), and to eliminate effects of a predictable rhythmic presentation rate
on attention and ERP components (see Doherty, Rao, Mesulam, & Nobre,
2005).
Fig. 1 Examples of the visual stimuli, showing the age of avatar manipulation, and different configurations of discs on the walls. Note that the avatar’s
gender always matched the participant’s gender
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hemisphere from electrodes Fp1, AF3, AF7, F1, F3, F5, F7,
FC1, FC3, FC5, FC7, C1 C3, C5, T7, CP1, CP3, CP5, TP7,
A1, P1, P3, P5, P7, PO3, PO7, PO9, O1, and from the homo-
logue electrodes over the right hemisphere. EEG data were
referenced online to electrode FCz, and grounded to electrode
AFz. EEG and EOG recordings were sampled at a rate of 500
Hz. Electrode impedances were kept at <25 KΩ.
Brain Vision Analyzer 2 software was used to prepare the
data prior to analysis. First, noisy or faulty electrodes were
interpolated from surrounding channels (a maximum of three
channels), then all channels were re-referenced offline to an
average reference (excluding eye channels and mastoids) and
the EEG signal was band-pass filtered (0.3–40 Hz, 12 dB/oct).
Data containing blinks and horizontal eye movements were
corrected using semi-automatic ocular Independent
Components Analysis (ICA) correction (which removed an
average of three components per participant), then the data
was segmented into epochs of 1,100 ms time-locked to picture
onset (-100 – 1,000 ms). Any trial where the participant made
an incorrect picture judgment was eliminated from further
ERP analysis, then each trial was individually inspected to
identify and discard trials with non-ocular artifacts (drifts,
channel blockings, EEG activity exceeding ± 75μV), using a
semi-automatic artifact rejection algorithm. Together, these
procedures resulted in an average trial loss of 11.3% per par-
ticipant, and an average of 64 accepted segments per condi-
tion/participant. A 2 (Perspective) × 2 (Consistency) × 2
(Avatar) ANOVA testing trial loss across conditions revealed
no difference between avatar conditions (p = .71) or perspec-
tive (p = .15) or any interactions (all ps > .1), but significantly
less accepted segments per participant for inconsistent trials
than consistent trials (61 vs. 67; F(1, 32) = 65.23, p < .001, pη
2
= .67), due to differences in accuracy in these conditions (see
behavioral results below). Finally, the signal at each electrode
site was aligned to a 100-ms baseline, then averaged separate-
ly for each experimental condition (Fig. 3).
ERP data analysis
Three ERP components were identified for analysis, based on
previous research that has examined perspective and consisten-
cy effects in a visual perspective-taking task (McCleery et al.,
2011), and ERP studies of self-referential processing (e.g.,
Cygan et al., 2014; Deschrijver et al., 2016, 2017). Thus, our
analyses focused on the peak amplitude of the P200 (a positive-
going component, peaking between 200–260 ms over central
occipital electrode sites, associated with perceptual processing,
see Fig. 4), the peak latency and amplitude of the P300 (a
positive-going component peaking between 250–400 ms over
central parietal electrode sites, reflecting self-other distinctions,
see Fig. 5), and the mean amplitude over a late frontal slow-
wave (LFSW, between 400–700 ms over the left and right
lateral frontal cortex, reflecting management of self-other con-
flicts, see Fig. 6). We note that our P300 component is consis-
tent with research in the field of self-referential processing and
is comparable to the TP450 component seen inMcCleery et al.,
and attribute the slightly different topography and peak latency
to the fact that stimuli in McCleery et al. were presented in a
multi-modal auditory-visual format (e.g., Bshe sees N^ - [im-
age]), whereas all stimuli in the current study were presented in
a visual sequence (as is typical in this paradigm, e.g., Samson
et al., 2010; Santiesteban et al., 2014). In addition, we
Fig. 2 Schematic trial sequence of visual displays presented to participants in the visual perspective-taking task
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conducted exploratory analyses on the P100 amplitude (an ear-
ly positive-going component peaking between 80–120 ms over
central occipital electrode sites), since visual inspection of the
ERP waveforms suggested a group difference on this compo-
nent (see Figs. 4 and 7). The P100 is a sensory response to
visual stimuli, and is sensitive to stimulus parameters, such as
size and luminance, thus we tested for between-groups differ-
ences here to quantify early differences in the waveform due to
physical differences between adult and child avatar stimuli,
which may contaminate subsequent ERP effects.
The electrodes used to measure each component were as
follows: left frontal: AF7, F7, F5; right frontal: AF8, F6, F8;
central parietal: CP1, CP2, CPz, Pz, P1, P2; central occipital:
POz, PO3, PO4, Oz, O1, O2. Peak amplitudes (P100, P200,
and P300), latencies to peak amplitudes (P300), and mean
amplitudes (LFSW) were identified using the time intervals
defined above using Brain Vision Analyzer’s automatic peak
detection algorithm and measured for each individual elec-
trode in the relevant conglomerate, then averaged within the
relevant region for each participant and condition. For the
statistical analysis of amplitude (and latency) data over central
occipital and central parietal components (P100, P200, and
P300), ANOVAs with variables Perspective (self vs. other),
Consistency (consistent vs. inconsistent), and Avatar (adult vs.
child) were conducted. The LFSW was analyzed as the mean
amplitude over lateral frontal sites using an ANOVA with
variables Hemisphere (left vs. right), Perspective (self vs. oth-
er), Consistency (consistent vs. inconsistent), and Avatar
(adult vs. child).
Results
Accuracy and response times for matching trials were analyzed
using separate 2 × 2 × 2 analyses of variance (ANOVA), with
Perspective (Self vs. Other) and Consistency (Consistent vs.
Inconsistent) as within-subjects variables, and Avatar (Adult
vs. Child) as the between-subjects variable. Note that due to
space constraints, only significant or marginal (p <= .06) effects
are presented in the text throughout this manuscript. Full statis-
tical effects for each experiment andmeasure are summarised in
the Appendix, and full data for each experiment and measure
are available on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/
bqw4h/?view_only=e275ad0e97dc42b7b6dcf17e089df06d).
In line with standard procedures, behavioral analyses did not
exclude trials based on ERP preprocessing. Incorrect picture
verification responses and trials where the participant did not
respond to the image in the given 2,000 ms were excluded from
the response-time analysis (5.5%), which was measured from
the onset of the picture. Resulting mean response accuracy and
response times for each condition are shown in Fig. 3.
Response accuracy
The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Perspective
(F(1, 32) = 4.20, p = .049, pη
2 = .12), reflecting higher accu-
racy when participants responded according to their own (M =
93.2%) compared to the avatar’s perspective (M = 91.8%). In
addition, a significant main effect of Consistency (F(1, 32) =
72.19, p < .001, pη
2 = .69) showed that accuracy was higher
when participants shared the same visual perspective with the
avatar (M = 96.5%), compared to when the two perspectives
were inconsistent (M = 88.5%). Neither Avatar or the interac-
tions were significant (all Fs < 2.25, p > .11).
Response times
The ANOVA showed a significant main effect of Consistency
(F(1, 32) = 93.62, p < .001, pη
2 = .75), with responses being
Fig. 3 Mean response accuracy and response times for each condition in Experiment 1. Error bars show standard errors
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slower when perspectives were inconsistent (M = 673 ms)
compared to when perspectives were consistent (M =
612ms). In addition, Perspective interacted significantly with
Consistency (F(1, 32) = 16.65, p < .001, pη
2 = .34).
Bonferroni corrected post hoc tests revealed that the
Consistency effect was larger when taking the Other perspec-
tive (t(33) = 11.56, p < .001; inconsistent minus consistent =
77 ms), compared to when taking the Self perspective (t(33) =
5.47, p < .001; inconsistent minus consistent = 44 ms). These
results replicate previous studies and show that participants
experienced both egocentric and altercentric interference,
though intrusions from one’s own knowledge were signifi-
cantly larger (paired-samples t-test comparing consistency
effect in each perspective condition: t(33) = 4.04, p < .001).
Neither the main effect of Perspective, Avatar, or the other
interactions were significant (all Fs < 1.72, ps > .2).
ERP effects
P100 The analysis of P100 amplitude revealed a significant
effect of Avatar (F(1, 32) = 4.73, p = .037, pη
2 = .13), with the
child avatar eliciting a larger amplitude (M = 7.57 μV) than
the adult avatar (M = 5.21 μV). Since the P100 is known to
reflect low-level perceptual analysis, we attribute this avatar
effect to physical differences between the child and adult stim-
uli (e.g., luminance, spatial frequency; Linkenkaer-Hansen
Fig. 5 Grand average ERPs over the central parietal lobe elicited by the target image for other-consistent, other-inconsistent, self-consistent and self-
inconsistent conditions, showing the P300 for the adult avatar (left panel) and the child avatar (right panel), in Experiment 1
Fig. 4 Grand average ERPs over the central occipital lobe elicited by the target image for other consistent, other-inconsistent, self-consistent and self-
inconsistent conditions, showing the P100 and P200 for the adult avatar (left panel) and the child avatar (right panel), in Experiment 1
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et al., 1998). There were no other significant main effects or
interactions (all Fs < 2.82, ps > .1).
P200 The ANOVA on P200 amplitude revealed a significant
main effect of Perspective (F(1, 32) = 9.99, p < .003, pη
2 =
.24), reflecting a larger P200 amplitude on self (M = 9.36 μV)
than other trials (M = 8.85 μV), and a significant main effect
of Consistency (F(1, 32) = 27.66, p < .001, pη
2 = .46),
reflecting a larger P200 amplitude on consistent (M = 9.47
μV) compared to inconsistent trials (M = 8.75 μV). In addi-
tion, a significant interaction between Perspective and
Consistency (F(1, 32) = 7.83, p < .01, pη
2 = .2) was found.
Bonferroni corrected post hoc tests revealed that the
Consistency effect was only significant when participants
were cued to take the other perspective (t(33) = 5.66, p <
.001), and not when cued to take their own perspective
(t(33) = 1.71, p = .098). This pattern suggests a robust ego-
centric interference effect, but a weaker or absent altercentric
interference effect. The effect of Avatar and the remaining
interactions were not significant, all Fs < 3.07, ps > .09.
P300 The ANOVA on latencies revealed a significant main
effect of Perspective (F(1, 32) = 25.26, p < .001, pη
2 = .44),
with longer peak latencies in other (M = 355 ms) than self (M
= 341 ms) trials. There was no significant main effect of
Consistency or Avatar, or any interactions (all Fs < 2.57, p >
.119).
Analysis of P300 amplitude revealed a significant main
effect of Consistency (F(1, 32) = 104.63, p < .001, pη
2 =
.77), with consistent trials (M = 4.89 μV) eliciting a larger
Fig. 6 Grand average ERPs over the left (left panels) and right (right
panels) frontal lobes elicited by the target image for other-consistent,
other-inconsistent, self-consistent and self-inconsistent conditions,
showing the LFSW for the adult avatar (top panel) and the child avatar
(bottom panel), in Experiment 1
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amplitude than inconsistent (M = 3.65 μV). Interestingly, a
significant interaction between Perspective and Avatar (F(1,
32) = 4.80, p = .036, pη
2 = .13) was found, subsumed under a
significant three-way interaction between Perspective,
Consistency, and Avatar (F(1, 32) = 5.41, p = .026, pη
2 =
.15). Follow-up analyses examined effects for adult and child
avatars separately. The adult avatar condition showed only a
significant consistency effect (F(1, 16) = 39.50, p < .001, pη
2
= .71), with consistent trials (M = 4.68 μV) eliciting a larger
P300 amplitude than inconsistent trials (M = 3.50 μV). In
contrast, the child avatar condition revealed significant main
effects of Perspective (F(1, 16) = 21.66, p < .001, pη
2 = .58;
self M = 4.87 μV vs. other M = 4.04 μV), and Consistency
(F(1, 16) = 72.10, p < .001, pη
2 = .82; consistentM = 5.10 μV
vs. inconsistent M = 3.81 μV). Moreover, the Perspective ×
Consistency interaction was significant (F(1, 16) = 19.43, p <
.001, pη
2 = .55). Bonferroni corrected post hoc tests revealed a
significant consistency effect when participants were taking
the other perspective (t(16) = 7.73, p < .001; consistent =
5.14 μV vs. inconsistent = 2.93 μV), but not when taking
the self perspective (t(16) = 1.57, p = .136; consistent =
5.04 μV vs. inconsistent = 4.69 μV).
LFSW The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of
Hemisphere (F(1, 32) = 5.02, p = .03, pη
2 = .14), with a larger,
more negative-going amplitude over the left hemisphere (M =
-2.80 μV) than the right hemisphere (M = -2.38 μV). There
was also a significant main effect of Consistency (F(1, 32) =
8.90, p = .005, pη
2 = .22; consistent < inconsistent), and a
main effect of Perspective (F(1, 32) = 6.28, p = .02, pη
2 =
.16; other < self). Similar to the P300 component, the three-
way interaction between Perspective, Consistency, and Avatar
was significant (F(1, 32) = 7.45, p = .01, pη
2 = .19). Further
analyses examined effects for adult and child avatars
Fig. 7 Topographic maps show the ERP waveform for each component
of interest. Data for the P100 shows the age of avatar effect, averaged over
condition. Data for the P200, P300 and LFSW show the consistency
effect (i.e. inconsistent minus consistent), separately for each avatar and
perspective condition
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separately, and showed that the Perspective × Consistency
interaction was only significant in the child avatar condition
(F(1, 16) = 5.15, p < .05, pη
2 = .24), and not in the adult avatar
condition (F(1, 16) = 2.43, p = .14). Bonferroni corrected post
hoc tests in the child avatar group revealed a significant con-
sistency effect when participants were cued to take the avatar’s
perspective (t(16) = 2.81, p = .01; consistent = -3.12 μV vs.
inconsistent = -2.26 μV), but not when they were cued to use
the self perspective (t(16) = .77, p = .45; consistent = -2.68 μV
vs. inconsistent = -2.53 μV).
To further investigate whether the condition effects ob-
served on the P300 and LFSW components can be differenti-
ated, we ran an exploratory ANOVA that crossed Component
(P300 vs. LFSW) × Site (Anterior vs. Posterior3) ×
Perspective (Self vs. Other) × Consistency (Consistent vs.
Inconsistent) × Avatar (Adult vs.Child). This analysis showed
a significant interaction between Component and Site (F(1,
32) = 26.63, p < .001, pη
2 = .45), reflecting a significantly
larger positivity over posterior sites for the P300 compared to
the LFSW component. More importantly, this effect was sub-
sumed under three-way interactions that revealed statistically
different topographic distributions of condition effect between
the two components. A significant Component × Site ×
Consistency interaction (F(1, 32) = 43.42, p < .001, pη
2 =
.58) showed that the consistency effect was significantly larg-
er on the P300 component than the LFSW component over
posterior (t(33) = 11.74, p < .001) and anterior sites (t(33) =
4.93, p < .001), though this difference was greater over pos-
terior sites. Additionally, a significant Component × Site ×
Perspective interaction (F(1, 32) = 48.67, p < .001, pη
2 =
.60) revealed different effects of Perspective between P300
and LFSW components over posterior (t(33) = 6.63, p <
.001) and anterior sites (t(33) = -4.93, p < .001). These find-
ings provide some tentative evidence to suggest that the two
components, emerging in consecutive but non-overlapping
time windows, may reflect distinct stages of processing.
In summary, Experiment 1 replicated previous research in
showing that both egocentric and altercentric biases interfered
with visual perspective-taking, though the altercentric effect
was smaller than the egocentric effect. Crucially, our ERP data
revealed the first evidence that age of avatar modulates these
effects; effects consistent with egocentric and altercentric in-
trusions were evident on P300 and LFSWamplitudes for adult
avatars (i.e., increased amplitudes on consistent vs. inconsis-
tent trials for both other and self perspectives), but altercentric
effects on these components were attenuated with a child av-
atar (i.e., increased amplitudes on consistent vs. inconsistent
trials only for the other perspective). These findings provide
initial evidence that participants inferred different mental
states for child and adult avatars, possibly due to an own-age
bias, which facilitated spontaneous perspective-taking for a
similar age other, but weakened perspective-taking for a dis-
similar age other.
Nevertheless, age of avatar did not modulate behavioural
responses, as the hypothesized Perspective × Consistency ×
Avatar interaction was not significant on the reaction time
measure. When reflecting on why such effects did not emerge
on behavioural measures it is important to note that these
results were revealed when age of avatar was manipulated
between groups, when participants were tested on a high num-
ber of trials, and when they were instructed to respond accord-
ing to both self and other perspectives. Although we reduced
influences from individual differences on participants’ re-
sponses by matching the adult and child avatar groups across
numerous key measures (i.e., gender, age, empathy, inhibitory
control), it is possible that other unexpected differences
existed between the two groups. In addition, by testing both
self and other perspectives within the same experiment, the
difference between self and avatar perspectives was made sa-
lient, and computing the avatar’s perspective on a given trial
was task-relevant. This design makes it difficult to conclude
that modulations of altercentric interference (i.e., on the self
trials) reflect genuine influences on automatic perspective-
taking, and thus might reflect simple carry-over effects from
having to compute the avatar’s perspective on ‘other’ perspec-
tive trials. Indeed, whether participants were asked to verify
the number of discs according to both their own and the ava-
tar’s perspective, or whether judgments were limited to their
own perspective only, has been identified as a key methodo-
logical difference between previous studies that do or do not
show mentalising effects (see Cole et al., 2016; Conway et al.,
2017), since automaticity can only be certain when the other
perspective is task-irrelevant. This observation is supported by
a recent eye-tracking study showing that altercentric interfer-
ence is greatest when participants have to switch between their
own and the avatar’s perspective across consecutive trials
(Ferguson et al., 2017), and a computerized false-belief task
showing that switching perspectives from self-to-other is more
costly than from other-to-self (Bradford et al., 2015). Finally,
Experiment 1 tested a high number of trials (essential for ERP
analysis, see Luck, 2014) as in McCleery et al. (2011), which
is significantly higher than is typically used in behavioural
studies (e.g., Samson et al., 2010, N = 208), and thus may
have led to fatigue in our participants. This possibility was
tested in a post-hoc analysis on reaction time data, including
only the first half of experimental trials, which replicated the
finding that age of avatar did not modulate the Perspective ×
Consistency interaction (F = .64, p = .43). As such, fatigue is
less likely to account for reaction time insensitivity to the
predicted avatar-dependent modulation of the perspective
effect.
3 Anterior and posterior electrode sites were based on those used for the main
P300/LFSW analyses, with the anterior site including activity over left and
right frontal electrodes (AF7, F7, F5, AF8, F6, F8) and the posterior site
including activity over central parietal electrodes (CP1, CP2, CPz, Pz, P1, P2).
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In Experiments 2 and 3, we employed a purely behavioural
design (no ERPs), which allowed us to test a larger sample of
participants in a within-subjects design, in line with previous
research (e.g., Cole et al., 2016; Conway et al., 2017). While
employing such a within-subjects design alongside ERPs
would be ideal to fully understand the observed ERP effects,
the necessary impact on increased trial numbers makes this
option unviable (i.e., this design would require 1248 trials in
total to match trials per condition (N = 72) to Experiment 1).
By not recording ERPs, we were able to significantly reduce
the number of trials (Expt. 1 = 624 vs. Expt. 2 = 312 vs. Expt.
3 = 208 trials). Thus, in Experiment 2 we tested the effects of
age of avatar in a fully crossed within-subjects design that
tapped both self and other perspectives to examine whether
age of avatar effects would be evident on behavioural re-
sponses when effects from individual differences (resulting
from Experiment 1’s mixed design) were eliminated. We ex-
pected to replicate the egocentric and altercentric effects on
accuracy and reaction time measures. More important for the
current research, if the effects of avatar seen on P300 and
LFSW amplitudes genuinely reflect distinct self-other biases
for adult and child observers then we expected to observe this
avatar × consistency × perspective interaction on the behav-
ioural responses in Experiment 2. Specifically, we predicted
that egocentric interference would disrupt reaction times for
both adult and child avatars, but that altercentric interference
would only be observed for an adult, and not a child, avatar.
In Experiment 3 we further examined whether age of avatar
influences ‘pure’ altercentric intrusion effects by testing self-
perspective trials in isolation. Thus, if the altercentric effect truly
reflects age-biased differences in spontaneous other perspective-
taking then we expected to see reduced altercentric interference
for child versus adult avatars when participants were never
prompted to take the avatars perspective. In contrast, if these
effects purely reflect carry-over effects from explicit, non-
automatic mentalizing on other perspective trials, then we would
expect the age-modulation of the altercentric effect to disappear
when the self perspective was assessed in isolation.
Experiment 2
Method
Participants
Fifty-nine English-speaking Caucasian students from the
University of Kent took part in the study. Four participants
were removed due to an overall accuracy at or below chance,
two participants were removed due to one or more conditions
with 0% accuracy, and one participant was removed due to an
average response time (M = 927 ms) that fell more than 2.5
standard deviations from the mean of all other participants (M
= 602 ms; SD = 99.7). Thus, the final sample consisted of 52
participants (39 female; 50 right-handed; Mage 19.8 years).
Sample size was determined a priori to match the target sam-
ple size used in Conway et al.’s (2017) Experiment 3 that
manipulated three independent variables in a visual
perspective-taking task (N = 54), and which was three times
the size of Furlanetto et al. (2016; N = 18).
Materials
The visual stimuli were identical to those used in Experiment 1.
Procedure
The procedure was a modified version of Experiment 1, based
on that used by Furlanetto et al. (2016) and Conway et al.
(Conway et al., 2017, Experiment 3), where participants ver-
ified the number of discs according to their own or the avatar’s
perspective, and age of avatar was manipulated within partic-
ipants. Only behavioral responses were recorded.
The task began with a practice block of 26 trials, followed
by six blocks of 52 trials (24 matching, 24 mismatching, and
four fillers). Three consecutive blocks included an adult avatar
in the center of the room, and the next three consecutive
blocks included a child avatar; the order of these blocks was
counterbalanced across participants. Half the trials (24 per
block) were consistent and half were inconsistent. Trials were
presented in a pseudorandom order within each block, with
the same constraints as in Experiment 1, and the full experi-
ment lasted approximately 40 min.
Results
Accuracy and response times for matching trials were analyzed
using within-subjects 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVAs, crossing
Perspective (Self vs. Other), Consistency (Consistent vs.
Inconsistent), Avatar (Adult vs. Child), and Order (Adult avatar
first vs. Child avatar first). Incorrect responses and trials where
the participant did not respond to the image in the given 2,000ms
(10%) were excluded from the response-time analysis. Mean
response accuracy and response times for each condition are
shown in Fig. 8.
Response accuracy
Overall accuracy was high (91.3%). The ANOVA revealed
the expected significant main effect of Consistency (F(1,
50) = 93.23, p < .001, pη
2 = .65), showing higher accuracy
when participants shared the same visual perspective with
the avatar (M = 97.5%), compared to when the two per-
spectives were inconsistent (M = 85.1%). In addition, the
Perspective × Consistency interaction was significant
(F(1, 50) = 4.01, p = .05, pη
2 = .07). Bonferroni corrected
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post hoc tests revealed a larger consistency effect when
taking the other perspective (t(51) = 7.98, p < .001; con-
sistent minus inconsistent = 15%), compared to when tak-
ing the self perspective (t(51) = 6.52, p < .001; consistent
minus inconsistent = 10%); paired-samples t-test compar-
ing the consistency effect in each perspective condition:
t(51) = 2.0, p = .051. None of the remaining main effects
or interactions reached significance (Fs < 3.36, ps > .07).
Response times
The ANOVA showed a significant main effect of Consistency
(F(1, 50) = 105.86, p < .001, pη
2 = .68), with slower responses
when self and other perspectives were inconsistent (M = 668
ms) compared to when they were consistent (M = 575 ms). In
addition, Perspective interacted significantly with Avatar (F(1,
50) = 6.84, p = .012, pη
2 = .12). Overall, processing of the self
versus other perspective was enhanced when a child avatar
was present (t(51) = 2.02, p = .05; other minus self = 19
ms), but there was no difference when an adult avatar was
present (t(51) = .56, p = .58; other minus self = -6 ms).
However, this effect was further modulated by Order (F(1,
50) = 7.57, p = .008, pη
2 = .13), which showed that the
Perspective × Avatar interaction was only significant when
the child avatar condition was tested first (F(1, 23) = 14.39,
p = .001, pη
2 = .39), and not when the adult avatar was tested
first (F(1, 27) = .01, p = .92). Perspective also interacted sig-
nificantly with Consistency (F(1, 50) = 21.44, p < .001, pη
2 =
.3), showing the expected pattern of greater egocentric inter-
ference on other trials (t(51) = 11.34, p < .001; inconsistent
minus consistent = 118 ms) than altercentric interference on
self trials (t(51) = 6.48, p < .001; inconsistentminus consistent
= 68 ms); paired-samples t-test comparing consistency effect
in each perspective condition: t(51) = 4.65, p < .001.
Crucially, the three-way interaction between Avatar,
Perspective, and Consistency was significant (F(1, 50) = 4.46,
p = .04, pη
2 = .08), andwas further modulated byOrder (F(1, 50)
= 4.04, p = .05, pη
2 = .08). Follow-up analyses showed that the
Avatar × Perspective × Consistency interaction was only signif-
icant when the child avatar condition was tested first (F(1, 23) =
6.11, p = .02, pη
2 = .21), and not when the adult avatar was tested
first (F(1, 27) = .01, p = .93). The three-way interaction was
therefore examined for the child avatar first context, testing ef-
fects for adult and child avatars separately. The adult avatar con-
dition showed a significant consistency effect (F(1, 23) = 37.14,
p < .001, pη
2 = .62; consistent < inconsistent), but no Perspective
× Consistency interaction (F(1, 23) = .13, p = .72). In contrast,
the child avatar condition revealed significant main effects of
Perspective (F(1, 23) = 7.96, p = .01, pη
2 = .26; self < other)
andConsistency (F(1, 23) = 41.40, p< .001, pη
2 = .64; consistent
< inconsistent), and a significant Perspective × Consistency in-
teraction (F(1, 23) = 14.76, p < .001, pη
2 = .39). Bonferroni
corrected post hoc tests revealed that the Consistency effect
was significantly larger when taking the Other perspective
(t(23) = 6.30, p < .001; inconsistent minus consistent = 158
ms), compared to when taking the Self perspective (t(23) =
3.47, p = .002; inconsistent minus consistent = 57 ms); paired-
samples t-test comparing consistency effect in each perspective
condition: t(23) = 3.16, p = .004.
None of the remaining main effects or interactions reached
significance (Fs < 1, ps > .4).
Summary
In sum, Experiment 2 further replicated egocentric and
altercentric interference during visual perspective-taking,
with larger egocentric than altercentric effects. Crucially,
response time data revealed that the altercentric effect was
Fig. 8 Mean response accuracy and response times for each condition in Experiment 2. Error bars show standard errors
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modulated by age of avatar; interference was significantly
weaker for a child versus an adult avatar. This pattern is
therefore consistent with the ERP effects on P300 and
LFSW in Experiment 1, and thus provides further evi-
dence that participants inferred different mental states
for child and adult avatars, possibly due to an own-age
bias. Interestingly, this effect only occurred when the
child avatar condition was tested first; when the child
avatar blocks were preceded by blocks with an adult av-
atar the consistency effect was comparable for adult and
child avatars. This pattern shows that the experimental
context has a strong influence on behavioral perspective-
taking effects. When perspective was task-relevant, the
automatic attentive processing of an adult avatar’s per-
spective in the first half of the experiment increased the
salience of a child avatar’s perspective in subsequent
blocks by prompting participants to attend more closely
to the avatar’s visual perspective. In line with our predic-
tions, however, automatic processing of the child’s per-
spective was reduced when attentive processing was not
primed by an adult avatar, even when that child avatar’s
perspective was task-relevant. In Experiment 3 we exam-
ined these context effects further by testing age of avatar
effects on self-perspective trials in isolation (i.e., where
the avatar’s perspective was task-irrelevant).
Experiment 3
Method
Participants
Forty-eight English-speaking Caucasian students from the
University of Kent took part in the study. Two participants were
removed due to an overall accuracy at or below chance, and one
participant was removed due to an average response time (M =
1156, ms) that fell more than 2.5 standard deviations from the
mean of all other participants (M = 578ms; SD = 100). Thus, the
final sample consisted of 45 participants (39 female; 39 right-
handed;Mage 19.6 years). Sample sizewas determined a priori to
match the target sample size used in Conway et al.’s (2017)
Bcloaked^ avatar visual perspective-taking task that tapped the
self perspective only (N = 48), which was three times the size of
Samson et al.’s (2010) original dot perspective task (N = 16).
Materials and procedure
The visual stimuli were identical to those used in Experiment 1.
The procedure was based on that used by Samson et al. (2010;
Experiment 3; see also Cole et al., 2016; Conway et al., 2017;
Santiesteban et al., 2014). Participants were asked to verify the
number of discs according to their own perspective on every trial;
the avatar’s perspective was never probed or mentioned. Only
behavioral responses were recorded.
The task began with a practice block of 26 trials, followed by
four blocks of 52 trials (24 matching, 24 mismatching, and four
fillers). Two consecutive blocks included an adult avatar in the
center of the room, and the next two consecutive blocks included
a child avatar; the order of these blocks was counterbalanced
across participants. Half the trials (24 per block) were consistent
and half were inconsistent. Trials were presented in a pseudoran-
dom order within each block, with the same constraints as in
Experiment 1, and the full experiment lasted approximately 20
min.
Results
Accuracy and response times for matching trials were analyzed
usingwithin-subjects 2 × 2 × 2ANOVAs, crossing Consistency
(Consistent vs. Inconsistent), Avatar (Adult vs. Child), and
Order (Adult avatar first vs. Child avatar first). Incorrect re-
sponses and trials where the participant did not respond to the
image in the given 2,000 ms (6.3%) were excluded from the
response-time analysis. Mean response accuracy and response
times for each condition are shown in Fig. 9.
Response accuracy
Overall accuracy was high (94%); however, the ANOVA re-
vealed a marginal main effect of Consistency (F(1, 43) = 4.00,
p = .052, pη
2 = .09), showing higher accuracy when partici-
pants shared the same visual perspective with the avatar (M =
95.2%), compared to when the two perspectives were incon-
sistent (M = 93%). None of the remaining main effects or
interactions were significant (Fs < 1.93, ps > .17).
Response times
The ANOVA showed a significant main effect of Consistency
(F(1, 43) = 26.97, p < .001, pη
2 = .39), with slower responses
when the avatar’s perspective was inconsistent (M = 600 ms)
compared to consistent (M = 561 ms) with the participant’s
view. Crucially, this effect of Consistency was modulated by
Avatar (F(1, 43) = 4.56, p = .038, pη
2 = .1), reflecting a larger
consistency effect when the central avatar was an adult, t(44) =
4.67, p < .001 (Inconsistent minus Consistent = 48 ms), com-
pared to when the avatar was a child, t(44) = 4.03, p < 0.001
(Inconsistent minus Consistent = 28 ms); paired-samples t-test
comparing the consistency effect in each avatar condition: t(44)
= 2.13, p = .04. The main effect of Avatar was not significant (F
= 1.34, p = .25). The Avatar × Block order interaction was
marginal, F(1, 43) = 3.5, p = .068, pη
2 = .08, reflecting faster
overall reaction times for child than adult avatars when the adult
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avatar was tested in the first block (564 vs. 586 ms), but no
difference between child and adult avatars when the child avatar
was tested in the first block (588 vs. 582 ms). None of the other
effects were close to significance, Fs < 1.7, ps > .2.
Summary
Experiment 3 further replicated altercentric effects on visual per-
spective-taking, evenwhen participants were only ever instructed
to refer to their own perspective during the experiment (i.e., the
avatar’s perspective was task-irrelevant). Importantly, response
times showed that this interference effect was significantly re-
duced when a child avatar was present compared to when an
adult avatar was present. In contrast to Experiment 2, the presen-
tation order of child/adult avatar conditions did not modulate the
effect of avatar on consistency, which suggests that an adult
avatar only enhances automatic attentive processing of a child’s
visual perspective when the experimental context makes this
perspective task-relevant.
General discussion
The experiments presented here examine for the first time how
the age of an observed person (adult vs. child avatar) influ-
ences adults’ visual perspective-taking, particularly the degree
to which they experience interference from their own or the
other person’s perspective. In Experiment 1 participants com-
pleted the avatar visual perspective-taking task for both self
and other perspectives, and age of avatar was manipulated
between two groups. We recorded ERPs alongside behavioral
measures (reaction time and response accuracy) to examine
the effects of perspective-taking and age of avatar in real-time.
In Experiments 2 and 3 we replicated the age of avatar ma-
nipulation in a within-subjects design, and examined Bpure^
altercentric intrusion effects by testing self-perspective trials
in isolation (Experiment 3), with only behavioral responses
recorded.
In line with previous experiments that have employed this
task (e.g., Catmur et al., 2016; Conway et al., 2017; Ferguson
et al., 2017; Nielsen et al., 2015; Samson et al., 2010;
Santiesteban et al., 2014; Qureshi et al., 2010), participants
experienced difficulty ignoring the irrelevant perspective
(i.e., what they saw and what the avatar saw) when the two
perspectives differed. That is, responses were slower and less
accurate, and ERPs revealed smaller P200/P300/LFSW am-
plitudes, when the self and other’s visual perspectives were
inconsistent. As in previous studies, egocentric interference
was greater than altercentric interference, as one’s own per-
spective elicited greater disruption to perspective-taking than
the avatar’s perspective (on reaction times and P200/P300/
LFSW amplitudes).
Age of avatar effects on perspective-taking
The most important finding across these three experiments is
that age of avatar modulated the magnitude of altercentric
interference on self-perspective trials. In Experiment 1, the
amplitude of P300 and LFSW ERP components was influ-
enced by the consistency of self and other perspectives for
adult avatars only; altercentric effects on these components
were eliminated when a child avatar was present. In
Experiments 2 and 3, this pattern was corroborated by behav-
ioral data, with reaction times showing a smaller consistency
effect for self trials when the central avatar was a child com-
pared to when the avatar was an adult.4 These findings are
4 We attribute the non-significant age of avatar effect on behavioral data in
Experiment 1 to the between-groups design, which is likely to have increased
noise on this variable.
Fig. 9 Mean response accuracy and response times for each condition in Experiment 3. Error bars show standard errors
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consistent with prior research suggesting that the degree to
which people spontaneously infer other peoples’mental states
is influenced by the degree of similarity that they feel with that
other person (e.g., Davis et al., 1996; Mahajan &Wynn, 2012;
Mitchell et al., 2006; Pfeifer et al., 2009; Smith & Mackie,
2016). Interestingly, age of avatar did not influence the mag-
nitude of egocentric biases. This pattern suggests that al-
though the automatic processing of perspectives is weakened
for dissimilar child avatars, observers do not compensate by
increasing their reliance on the self perspective. This finding is
an interesting contrast to previous studies that have reported
greater egocentric interference, but no increase in altercentric
interference, when people are taking the perspective of an
ingroup member compared to an outgroup member (e.g.,
Savitsky et al., 2011; Simpson & Todd, 2017; Todd et al.,
2011). We attribute this difference to the salience and
magnitude of similarity between the self and other between
experiments. Specifically, Simpson and Todd (2017) manipu-
lated in/out groups in the avatar visual perspective-taking task
using short-term or temporary affiliations. In Experiment 1 the
avatar was a University mascot (so affiliations were related to
individuals’ length of time at University and interest in
University sports), and Experiment 2 used a minimal-group
design, where the basis for group membership was arbitrary
and temporary (i.e., affiliations were based on Bpersonality
colors^). In addition, in Simpson and Todd’s Experiment 1
the University mascot was a bird rather than a human avatar,
which may have reduced other perspective-taking effects and
increased participants’ reliance on the self perspective. In con-
trast, the current experiments used realistic images of human
avatars in a 3D room, and similarity to the avatar was manip-
ulated based on a salient and long-term property of group
membership – age. Clearly both manipulations provide valu-
able insights into the effect of similarity on self and other
perspective judgments, and together the results suggest that
egocentric/altercentric tendencies are modulated by the
strength of affiliation to in/out groups.
We attribute the reduced altercentric effect in the current
experiments to an own-age bias whereby adult participants
experienced enhanced processing of the own-age avatar’s
perspective. This effect is consistent with prior research that
has shown heightened attention towards faces that are in the
same age category as the perceiver (e.g., Bailey et al., 2014),
superior memory for faces of one’s own age group (Rhodes
& Anastasi, 2012), and higher judgments of trust for own-
age relative to other-age people (Slessor et al., 2014).
Particularly relevant to our study is Slessor et al.’s (2010)
research showing that young adults exhibit enhanced eye-
gaze following for own-age faces compared to faces of older
adults. Although this study did not directly compare effects
for adult versus child faces, the findings suggest that young
adults preferentially process gaze cues from the faces of
their own age group. Gaze direction provides a strong cue
in guiding attention towards the location of an actor's gaze
(Borji, Parks, & Itt i , 2014; Castelhano, Wieth, &
Henderson, 2007). Thus, applied to our own results, this
implies that the adult avatar’s eye gaze was more salient to
our young adult participants than the child avatar’s eye
gaze, which increased the likelihood that participants spon-
taneously inferred the adult’s visual perspective. Further
research is needed to validate this attentional account of
the age-related altercentric effect in our data, ideally using
eye-tracking (as in Ferguson et al., 2017) to examine wheth-
er early visual biases to the avatar’s gaze location are re-
duced for child versus adult avatars.
An alternative explanation for the reduced interference
from a child avatar’s perspective is that our adult participants
may have assumed a reduced mental capacity for children
compared to adults, or placed less importance on their differ-
ing perspective due to their young age. Although to our
knowledge no research to date has directly tested this sugges-
tion, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that this may be the
case. For example, children do not develop all the necessary
skills for complex social communication until around 9 years
old (Hollebrandse, van Hout, & Hendricks, 2014; Perner &
Wimmer, 1985; Sullivan, Zaitchik, & Tager-Flusberg, 1994;
Wellman et al., 2001), and in fact ToM continues to develop
throughout adolescence and well into our twenties (e.g.,
Blakemore, 2008). In addition, metacognitive abilities (i.e.,
the capacity to reflect on one’s own thoughts and behaviours)
that are closely related to ToM (Carruthers, 2009; Efklides,
2008; Kuhn, 2000; Schneider, 2008) show a prolonged devel-
opmental trajectory, reaching a peak in late adolescence (Weil
et al., 2013). Thus, future research should disentangle whether
the reduced altercentric intrusion effects seen for child avatars
in the current study are driven by a general enhancement of
visual processing for own-age others, or a more specific effect
that is driven by assumptions of reduced mental awareness in
younger children.
Distinguishing mentalizing and attention effects
during perspective-taking
Our results also make an important contribution to the debate
about mentalizing versus directional bases of the altercentric
effect in this avatar visual perspective-taking task. The fact
that altercentric interference was reduced for the child avatar,
even when the avatar’s perspective was task-irrelevant, sug-
gests that adults do not automatically compute the visual per-
spective of a child avatar, and that altercentric effects for the
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adult avatar were truly spontaneous and not attributable to
simple carry-over effects from other perspective trials (Cole
et al., 2016; Conway et al., 2017). To our knowledge, only a
mentalizing account would predict differences in perspective-
taking based on the age of the avatar (also the in/out group
effects reported in Simpson & Todd, 2017), since directional
features were matched between avatars (as shown by the
Posner attentional pre-test). This finding therefore conflicts
with a purely attentional explanation for the altercentric pat-
tern (e.g., Catmur et al., 2016; Cole et al., 2016; Conway et al.,
2017; Heyes, 2014; Santiesteban et al., 2014). Nevertheless,
we do not rule out the influence of sub-mentalizing on auto-
matic perspective-taking, since directional features of the av-
atar clearly do provide low-level cues to guide attention (as
shown in our pre-test and previous research, e.g., Cole et al.,
2016). Instead we propose that both implicit mentalizing and
directional processes underlie the altercentric effect, as sug-
gested by previous ERP research that has observed modula-
tions of the P300 and LFSW components in different social
contexts. Similarity to self may therefore modulate the degree
to which observers rely on the self/other perspective via a top-
down process that focuses attention onto differences in mental
states/capacity or altered gaze following (e.g., Slessor et al.,
2010).
The current research is among a growing number of
published studies that have examined the brain’s electro-
physiological responses during self/other perspective in-
ferences, thus we can begin to interpret the underlying
mechanisms within this context. First, the finding that
perspective-inconsistent and perspective-consistent condi-
tions were distinguishable on the P300 component sup-
ports the proposal that P300 indexes the self-other distinc-
tion and conflict resolution in social contexts. Moreover,
our results support the proposal that modulations of the
P300 reflect social inferences that distinguish between
self and other perspectives, as well as the recruitment of
higher-order cognitive processes to evaluate self-related
stimuli, including increased allocation of attention and
conflict resolution. The direction of the consistency effect
(i.e., smaller P300 amplitudes for inconsistent vs. consis-
tent conditions) replicates that seen in tasks that require
self/other conflict monitoring (e.g., Cygan et al., 2014;
Deschrijver et al., 2016, 2017), and suggests that P300
amplitude is reduced when interference between perspec-
tives is high, and cognitive resources are required else-
where ( i .e . , to manage conf l ic t in inconsis tent
conditions; Deschrijver et al., 2017). Our results extend
this work by showing that this disruption is asymmetric
for self/other perspectives – the consistency effect was
greater when the conflict comes from one’s own
perspective than from someone else’s (reflected in the
perspective × consistency interaction on P300 amplitude)
– and can be differentially influenced by features of the
other person, such as their age (reflected in the age ×
perspective × consistency interaction on P300 amplitude).
In addition, perspective and consistency modulated effects
on the LFSW. Previous research has linked this waveform
to the processes of distinguishing mental states from real-
ity (Liu et al., 2004; Sabbagh & Taylor, 2000), including
the calculation of conflicting self/other perspectives (Jiang
et al., 2016), and the recruitment of domain-general exec-
utive processes to inhibit the self perspective when infer-
ring others’ perspectives (McCleery et al., 2011; Zhang
et al., 2009). We note that perspective and consistency
influenced the amplitude of P300 and LFSW in compara-
ble ways, therefore we are unable to distinguish the social
and executive processes that underlie each of these com-
ponents. However, our exploratory comparison of P300/
LFSW effects suggests that the consistency effect is dis-
sociable at the scalp level, thus suggesting that the P300
and LFSW might reflect distinct stages of processing.
Further research is needed to systematically test these
contributions and provide a clearer understanding of the
underlying mechanisms and their timecourse.
Our Experiment 1 is one of only two studies that have
recorded ERPs while participants complete the avatar visual
perspective-taking task (cf. McCleery et al., 2011). Despite
differences in the modality of stimulus presentation, there
are clear consistencies in the patterns of ERP effects between
our experiment (that employed a fully visual design) and
McCleery et al. (2011; who used a multi-modal auditory-vi-
sual design). Specifically, the P200 was modulated by per-
spective inconsistencies in both studies, showing sensitivity
to the different attentional demands when participants were
required to attend to/ignore discs on both walls (i.e., larger
P200 peak for the self-inconsistent condition compared to
other-inconsistent). Effects on our P300 component were also
consistent withMcCleery et al.’s TP450, revealing an effect of
perspective on peak latencies (other > self), and an effect of
consistency on peak amplitude (consistent > inconsistent), and
thus suggesting that these components reflect comparable self/
other distinction processes. Further, the LFSW amplitude dis-
tinguished consistent and inconsistent trials in both experi-
ments; however, the direction of this consistency effect dif-
fered between experiments. We attribute these opposing ef-
fects on the LFSW to the distinct and non-overlapping time
intervals used for calculating mean LFSW amplitudes across
experiments. Specifically, our LFSW time window (400–700
ms) was selected to cover processes leading up to the key-
board response (~650 ms), and was therefore likely to include
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processes that underlie the calculation of self/other perspec-
tives and conflict management. In contrast, McCleery et al.
observed effects over a later interval (600–800 ms), which
covered processes following the keyboard response, and thus
was more likely to reflect inhibitory processes involved in
selecting the appropriate perspective than calculating perspec-
tives (since this should have been complete). Nevertheless,
these findings highlight the value of measuring implicit and
explicit perspective-taking in the same task, since ERPs re-
vealed implicit sensitivity to the avatar’s perspective even be-
fore participants had made an explicit response. The value of
this electrophysiological approach is further demonstrated in
Experiment 1 since the age of avatar effects on the P300 and
LFSW components were not visible on the explicit behavioral
response measures. Therefore, future work that examines vi-
sual perspective-taking would benefit from examining the
time-course of implicit neural processing in this way.
Conclusion
The experiments reported here provide a novel extension to
research that has examined visual perspective-taking in a
healthy adult population. Across three experiments that
use behavioral and ERP measures we show the first evi-
dence that the degree to which people experience interfer-
ence from another’s (conflicting) visual perspective is mod-
ulated by the age of that other person; children elicit signif-
icantly reduced altercentric interference compared to adults.
Moreover, the degree to which perspective-taking was
disrupted for a child avatar was strongly influenced by con-
straints from the experimental context. We attribute this ef-
fect to an own-age bias, whereby adult participants experi-
enced enhanced processing of the own-age avatar’s per-
spective, which could reflect either enhanced visual pro-
cessing for own-age others or an inference on reduced men-
tal awareness in younger children. These findings argue
against the suggestion that the altercentric effect reflects
purely attentional features of the avatar, and instead support
an account where bothmentalizing and directional process-
es modulate automatic visual perspective-taking.
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Appendix
Table 1 Statistical effects for each behavioral measure in Experiment 1. Asterisks show significance of effects, where * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p <
0.001
df F p pη
2
Response accuracy Perspective 1, 32 4.2 .05 * .12
Consistency 1, 32 72.19 <.001 *** .69
Avatar 1, 32 .20 .66 <.01
Perspective × Avatar 1, 32 2.25 .14 .07
Consistency × Avatar 1, 32 .02 .88 <.01
Perspective × Consistency 1, 32 1.73 .2 .05
Perspective × Consistency × Avatar 1, 32 .66 .42 .02
Response times Perspective 1, 32 1.72 .20 .05
Consistency 1, 32 93.62 <.001 *** .75
Avatar 1, 32 .17 .69 <.01
Perspective × Avatar 1, 32 .69 .41 .02
Consistency × Avatar 1, 32 .20 .66 <.01
Perspective × Consistency 1, 32 16.65 <.001 *** .34
Perspective × Consistency × Avatar 1, 32 .54 .47 .02
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Table 2 Statistical effects for each ERPmeasure in Experiment 1. Asterisks show significance of effects, where * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
df F p pη
2
P100 amplitude Perspective 1, 32 1.16 .29 .04
Consistency 1, 32 2.82 .1 .08
Avatar 1, 32 4.73 .04 * .13
Perspective × Avatar 1, 32 2.0 .17 .06
Consistency × Avatar 1, 32 .21 .65 <.01
Perspective × Consistency 1, 32 <.01 .98 <.01
Perspective × Consistency × Avatar 1, 32 1.76 .19 .05
P200 amplitude Perspective 1, 32 9.99 .003 ** .24
Consistency 1, 32 27.66 <.001 *** .46
Avatar 1, 32 1.51 .23 .05
Perspective × Avatar 1, 32 .92 .34 .03
Consistency × Avatar 1, 32 1.29 .26 .04
Perspective × Consistency 1, 32 7.83 .009 ** .2
Perspective × Consistency × Avatar 1, 32 3.07 .09 .09
P300 latency Perspective 1, 32 25.26 <.001 *** .45
Consistency 1, 32 2.57 .12 .07
Avatar 1, 32 .29 .59 <.01
Perspective × Avatar 1, 32 .08 .78 <.01
Consistency × Avatar 1, 32 .2 .66 <.01
Perspective × Consistency 1, 32 .13 .72 <.01
Perspective × Consistency × Avatar 1, 32 .38 .54 .01
P300 amplitude Perspective 1, 32 3.01 .09 .09
Consistency 1, 32 104.63 <.001 *** .77
Avatar 1, 32 .6 .44 .02
Perspective × Avatar 1, 32 4.8 .04 * .13
Consistency × Avatar 1, 32 .21 .65 <.01
Perspective × Consistency 1, 32 .64 .43 .02
Perspective × Consistency × Avatar 1, 32 5.41 .03 * .15
LFSW Perspective 1, 32 6.28 .02 * .16
Consistency 1, 32 8.90 .005 *** .22
Avatar 1, 32 .04 .84 <.01
Hemisphere 1, 32 5.02 .03 * .14
Perspective × Avatar 1, 32 3.36 .08 .10
Consistency × Avatar 1, 32 .74 .40 .02
Perspective × Consistency 1, 32 .42 .52 .01
Perspective × Hemisphere 1, 32 .09 .77 <.01
Consistency × Hemisphere 1, 32 .10 .76 <.01
Hemisphere × Avatar 1, 32 .18 .67 <.01
Perspective × Consistency × Avatar 1, 32 7.45 .01 ** .19
Perspective × Consistency × Hemisphere 1, 32 .001 .96 <.01
Perspective × Hemisphere × Avatar 1, 32 3.01 .09 .09
Consistency × Hemisphere × Avatar 1, 32 .01 .92 <.01
Perspective × Consistency × Hemisphere × Avatar 1, 32 1.47 .24 .04
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Table 3 Statistical effects for each behavioral measure in Experiment 2. Asterisks show significance of effects, where * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p <
0.001
df F p pη
2
Response accuracy Perspective 1, 50 3.36 .07 .06
Consistency 1, 50 93.23 <.001 *** .65
Avatar 1, 50 .75 .39 .02
Order 1, 50 .13 .72 <.01
Perspective × Avatar 1, 50 .22 .64 <.01
Consistency × Avatar 1, 50 .14 .71 <.01
Order × Avatar 1,50 <.01 .99 <.01
Perspective × Consistency 1, 50 4.01 .05 * .07
Perspective × Order 1, 50 .64 .43 .01
Consistency × Order 1, 50 .15 .71 <.01
Perspective × Consistency × Avatar 1, 50 .27 .61 .01
Perspective × Consistency × Order 1, 50 <.01 .99 <.01
Perspective × Avatar × Order 1, 50 .03 .87 <.01
Consistency × Avatar × Order 1, 50 .02 .90 <.01
Perspective × Consistency × Avatar × Order 1, 50 .02 .89 <.01
Response times Perspective 1, 50 .70 .41 .01
Consistency 1, 50 105.86 <.001 *** .68
Avatar 1, 50 .02 .89 <.01
Order 1, 50 .69 .41 .01
Perspective × Avatar 1, 50 6.84 .01 * .12
Consistency × Avatar 1, 50 .05 .83 <.01
Order × Avatar 1,50 10.45 .002 ** .17
Perspective × Consistency 1, 50 21.44 <.001 *** .3
Perspective × Order 1, 50 .04 .85 <.01
Consistency × Order 1, 50 .19 .66 <.01
Perspective × Consistency × Avatar 1, 50 4.46 .04 * .07
Perspective × Consistency × Order 1, 50 .17 .69 <.01
Perspective × Avatar × Order 1, 50 7.57 .008 ** .13
Consistency × Avatar × Order 1, 50 2.31 .14 .04
Perspective × Consistency × Avatar × Order 1, 50 4.04 .05 * .08
Table 4 Statistical effects for each behavioral measure in Experiment 3. Asterisks show significance of effects, where * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p <
0.001
df F p pη
2
Response accuracy Consistency 1, 43 4.00 .05 * .04
Avatar 1, 43 .30 .59 <.01
Order 1, 43 1.93 .17 .04
Consistency × Avatar 1, 43 .06 .94 <.01
Consistency × Order 1, 43 .69 .41 .02
Avatar × Order 1, 43 1.71 .20 .04
Consistency × Avatar × Order 1, 43 .96 .33 .02
Response times Consistency 1, 43 26.97 <.001 *** .39
Avatar 1, 43 1.13 .30 .03
Order 1, 43 .11 .74 <.01
Consistency × Avatar 1, 43 4.56 .04 * .10
Consistency × Order 1, 43 1.66 .20 .04
Avatar × Order 1, 43 3.50 .07 .08
Consistency × Avatar × Order 1, 43 .22 .64 .01
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